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Abstract— This study aimed to investigate the 
relationship between internal corporate governance 
attributes and capital structure in a supply chain 
process of Malaysian listed firms. Most of prior works 
were based on agency theory, and the results are 
mixed. This study endeavored to examine the 
complementary relationship between multiple factors 
of governance to avoid providing repeated evidences 
and or to enrich the existing literature with different 
perspective, which can be achieved by supply chain 
strategy. The study was conducted in Malaysian listed 
firm of period 2014-2015. Regression analysis is used 
in this study as statistical tool of analysis. Based on 
statistical analysis, the results of this study reveal that 
only board size, board meeting, and audit committee 
size are correlated to capital structure. Other 
variables have no effect on capital structure. The 
analysis also showed that attributes of governance are 
complements to each other, in turn; this may lead to 
perfection of monitoring and management of the 
board decision making. This study contributes to 
protect beneficiary parties from manager’s 
manipulation in a supply chain strategy. Also, the 
results of this study can be used as a support to 
develop Malaysian code of governance. 
Keywords— Corporate Board, Audit Committee, Capital 
Structure, Complement, Supply Chain Strategy, 
Malaysia. 
1. Introduction 
With series of collapses that rocked American 
high-profile firms such as WorldCom, General 
Electric, AOL Time-Warner, and of course Enron, 
governance research becomes a growing field of 
accounting and management study around the 
globe for the supply chain strategies. This failure 
necessitates the relevant authorities of corporate 
governance in many countries to reevaluate, 
formulate, and tighten the code of governance [1-
7]. The important of corporate governance is to 
reduce the conflict of interests between manager 
and principal, and to ensure that interests are highly 
protected for shareholders [8-12]. In Malaysia, the 
investors’ confidence has been shaken since the 
financial failure begun in capital market during 
1997-98 [13,14]. To rebuild and bring back 
confidence of investor some Malaysian bodies 
consider that code of governance should become 
focus of attention. Finance Committee launched the 
code of governance in 1998 for both government 
and industry sectors. After that the Capital Market 
Master Plan was followed in 1999. Finally, Bank 
Negara Malaysia launched in 2001 the Financial 
Sector Master Plan to design the direction of 
financial sector [15]. Corporate governance plays 
an important role of business success and effective 
management, and still debatable and developable 
subject.  
Previous empirical studies focused on the influence 
of mix corporate governance elements on corporate 
performance and finance. Corporate governance 
analysis is useful to review and make sure that the 
mix of finance and best practices of corporate 
governance in particular firm are in place. 
Furthermore, most previous studies have examined 
the relationship between mix of corporate 
governance elements and firm performance 
ignoring the complementary effect. The current 
study endeavors to investigate the relationship 
between the key corporate governance elements 
and capital structure of Malaysian listed firms, and 
to explore whether this relationship is 
complementary or substitutive. Thus, the 
contribution of this study is to identify the role of 
the main factors of governance in capital structure 
with additional analysis to test the complementary 
impact. These factors are; board composition, 
board size, board meeting, audit committee 
composition, audit committee size, and audit 
committee meeting. Therefore, revealing evidence 
that capital structure is structured by specific 
corporate governance elements. The structure of 
this paper is arranged as follows. First, briefly 
explain the background of corporate governance 
practices in Malaysia. Second, discuss the relevant 
previous literature to develop research hypotheses. 
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Data and method are prepared next. Finally show 
the empirical findings and conclude the paper with 
the discussion, limitations and avenue of the future 
study. 
2. Background 
Supply chain strategy for improving the 
performance in supplying, listing and providing 
and delivering the products or services in 
companies has been necessary. The code of 
corporate governance in Malaysia is hybrid, which 
is similar to United Kingdom code of governance 
[3]. Malaysian code of governance was formally 
launched in March 2000 by Finance Committee on 
Corporate Governance, and largely formed from 
recommendations of  Cadbury Report and the 
Hampel Report (FCCG, 2000) quoted by  and [16-
21]. But some of these recommendations can be 
disputable because of the differences between 
Malaysian business environment and UK business 
environments, in terms of ownership concentration 
[9]. Since introducing the MCCG in 2000, 
Malaysian company was influenced positively by 
dint of reforms of best practice of governance, this 
code was recently reviewed in 2007 and 2012 to 
ensure that it remains relevant with best practices 
and standards of governance around the globe [6], 
[22]. The code of Malaysian governance was 
initiative started by Finance Committee in 1998 for 
both government and industry sectors. After that 
the Capital Market Master Plan was followed in 
1999 for next ten years to define the oversight of 
Malaysian capital market. Finally, Bank Negara 
Malaysia launched in 2001 the Financial Sector 
Master Plan to design the direction of financial 
sector for next ten years [21].  The code was 
essentially issued to identify the principles and 
processes of governance that companies may use to 
achieve the optimal framework of governance [5], 
[23]. 
3. Literature review and hypothesis 
development  
This section critically reviews the theoretical and 
empirical literature of the corporate governance 
attributes –capital structure relationship to develop 
research hypotheses of this study. This is necessary 
in order to enable the researcher to see the gaps that 
might have been left and/or to get a glance of some 
recommendations to conduct further studies that 
might have been reported in earlier studies. This 
study is theoretically based on agency theory. 
Therefore, there are two models of agency 
paradigms resulted in and Jensen’s seminal work. 
Jensen and Meckling provide the first model 
showing that equity issuance leads to conflicts 
between agent and owners. The second one 
provides another model showing that debt 
financing also leads to conflicts between 
shareholders and debt holders. In accordance with 
the framework, trading off the agency cost of debt 
against the debt benefit can result in an optimal 
capital structure [13], [15].  
Agency theory predicts a significant relationship 
between board composition and financial decision. 
Monitoring management can be more effectively 
conducted by outside directors than management 
directors because they play critical role as decision-
makers in other firms. In addition, it is because 
they give more concern about their reputation in the 
managerial labor market [7], [8], [24], [25]. 
Moreover, outside directors are expected to have 
more objective decision and have greater expertise 
than related directors. Therefore, boards with 
higher percentage of outside directors are assumed 
to be much more independent. Based on corporate 
governance practice and SOX Act of 2002, the 
relationship between board composition and 
financial decision is likely to be significant when 
independent directors are better monitors of 
managerial and financial process. 
However, empirical evidences on this relationship, 
in Malaysian perspective, study by (Heng, 
Azrbaijani, and San [22] have reported that board 
composition has significant positively relationship 
with debt to asset ratio of 75 non-financial firm 
during the period 2005-2008. Another study by 
Şener, Varoğlu, and Aren [23] they investigated the 
effect of board composition on firm performance of 
80 Turkish listed companies. They used three 
measures of board composition under three 
environmental dimensions. They found the outsider 
directors have no effect on ROA in first model. 
And negatively significantly effect on ROA when 
environmental dynamism is high. Finally, outsiders 
have insignificant impact of all environmental 
dimensions in moderating model. Ibrahim & 
Angelidis, have examined the relationship between 
outsiders and corporate social responsibility, the 
results indicate that independent directors give 
more concern toward corporate social 
responsibility and less concern toward economic 
performance [11]. Uzun, Szewczyk, & Varma, 
2004, have found that there is significant 
relationship between board composition and 
corporate fraud of US firm in 1978-2001 period 
[16]. Based on above explanations, the first 
hypothesis is proposed:  
Hypothesis 1: Board composition of Malaysian 
publicly listed firms has an impact on capital 
structure. 
There are many different perspectives on the role of 
board size. The board of firm, in turn, has the 
function of selection and reviewing nominees for 
positions of director and monitoring senior 
managers’ decision. It consistent with the 
information requirements of more complex 
operations tends to require lager board [4].  Agency 
Int. J Sup. Chain. Mgt  Vol. 8, No. 6, December 2019 
827 
theory predicts a negative relationship between 
board size and firm value. Because the board with 
more than eight members is likely to function 
ineffectively and easier for CEO to control [13].  
Empirically, some studies show mixed results, [22] 
have found that board size has significant 
negatively relationship with capital structure of 
Malaysian firms. In the same view by Brédart, [24] 
has found negative relationship between board size 
and financial stress of US firms. Johl, Kaur, & 
Cooper [25], investigate the issue of board size and 
firm performance of 700 financial and non-
financial firms, they found board size positively 
related to firm performance. In New Zealand 
perspective, board size was found positively related 
to firm performance and play critical role as being 
moderating of this relationship. The second 
hypothesis of this study is as follows: 
Hypothesis 2: The number of the members of 
director’s board in publicly listed firms in Malaysia 
has an influence on capital structure. 
This study suggests using the concept of 
complementarities between independent variables 
to figure out whether these variables have 
complementary or substitutive effect when they 
work together. In growing work, corporate 
governance attributes are classified as 
interdependent factors and complements to each 
other as bundle [1]. This study supposes that board 
size has an effective role in presence of audit 
committee size, the sub-hypothesis is proposed 
below: 
Hypothesis 2a: Board Size is more effective when 
it works together with audit committee size rather 
than substituted in Malaysian listed firms. 
Board meeting is considered to be an important 
factor since trustees or directors receive 
information about business of firm that enables 
them to act their important monitoring role. Agency 
theory suggests that frequent meetings of the board 
resulting in better performance and monitoring. 
This argument is proved in South Africa by Ntim & 
Osei [26], they provide results that the performance 
of firm can be improved by frequency of board 
meetings. One theoretical view proposes that the 
board activity can be highly performed by 
frequency of meetings during the year [17]. An 
opposing theoretical view suggests that frequency 
of board meetings is not useful to shareholders due 
to limited time outside directors spend with firms 
and additional expenses, the time can be spent for 
other meaningful things such as strategic 
management plans [18]. Johl [25], have found that 
board meeting has an inverse relationship with 
performance of Malaysian company. Another study 
by Vafeas, has proved that board meeting has 
inversely impact on firm value [17]. Negative 
relationship between board meeting and firm value 
has been explained also by Kyereboah-Coleman 
[31],  examined 103 listed firms from South Africa, 
Nigeria, Ghana, and Kenya over the period 1997-
2001. Inverse results in South Africa by Ntim et al., 
[26] they provide evidence that the performance of 
firm can be improved by frequency of board 
meetings. Also, In [27], have found inverse 
relationship between number of board meeting and 
foreign non-executive directors, CEO 
compensation and growth of UK largest listed 
firms. Therefore, based on mix evidences above the 
second hypothesis is proposed as followings: 
Hypothesis 3: The frequency of board of directors 
meeting in publicly listed firms in Malaysia has an 
influence on capital structure. 
To better reforms of corporate governance, 
complementarities between corporate governance 
mechanisms should be taking into consideration. In 
addition, corporate governance attributes should be 
comprehensive rather than piecemeal [10]. This 
study investigates whether board meeting is 
complement of substitute element with audit 
committee size, therefore, the following hypothesis 
is proposed:    
Hypothesis 3a: Board of directors meeting is more 
effective when it works together with audit 
committee size rather than substituted in Malaysian 
listed firms.      
Establishing an audit committee is one of the 
functions of board of director. Agency theory 
assumes that separation between members whether 
work with the board or audit committee could tend 
to reduce principal-agent conflict and cost of this 
relationship. Empirically, Wang & Huynh [30], 
have stated that audit committee independence has 
moderating role and positive impact on the 
relationship between financial and nonfinancial 
firm performance. Saat, Karbhari, Xiao, & Heravi; 
Al-Mamun, Yasser, Rahman, Wickramasinghe, & 
Nathan [28, 29], have investigated the same issue 
in Bursa Malaysia in 221 firms, they find strong 
relationship between independence of audit 
committee members and firm performance. 
Therefore, the following hypothesis can be 
proposed: 
Hypothesis 4: The audit committee composition in 
publicly listed firms of Malaysia has an effect on 
capital structure. 
Size of audit committee is considered to be one of 
audit committee characteristics that play an 
important role in affecting firm value. Empirically, 
[28] have investigated total of 150 firms of 
Australia’s S&P300 listed firms, the result shows 
that small number of audit committee with high 
qualification of financial expertise and more 
experience are positively associated with firm 
performance. Another study by [29], examined the 
effectiveness of audit committee on financial 
performance; their results show no significant 
relationship between audit size and financial firm 
performance. Al-Mamun et al., [29] in their study 
of Malaysian firms, they found positive 
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relationship between audit size and firm 
performance. In UK market state that audit 
committee size is positively associated with 
intellectual capital (IC) disclosure of 100 UK listed 
firms. To this end, this study considers that audit 
committee size should be investigated in Malaysia 
Market. Therefore, the following hypothesis can be 
proposed: 
Hypothesis 5:  The audit committee size in 
publicly listed firms of Malaysia has an impact on 
capital structure. 
The purpose of this study is to explain 
characteristics of corporate governance in terms of 
complementarities and substitute concept. This 
study argues that these characteristics compose 
complementary system, to prove that these 
elements are more effective when they work 
together. This study proposes that audit committee 
is more effective when it works with board size and 
board meeting. 
Hypothesis 5a: The audit committee size is more 
effective when it works together with board size 
rather than substituted in Malaysian listed firms. 
Hypothesis 5b: The audit committee size is more 
effective when it works together with board 
meeting rather than substituted in Malaysian listed 
firms. 
Audit committee activity is one of important 
attributes of audit committee. The effectiveness of 
audit committee is related to frequency of held 
meetings during the year. state that more frequency 
of meetings of audit committee with internal 
auditors are much better known about accounting 
and audit issues [2]. This study gives much 
attention for audit activities and structure to 
produces significant and robust results of 
Malaysian market and this relationship will be 
tested as Edgeworth complement. Most of prior 
studies provide mixed evidences. For example, 
[30], provide evidence that there is no relationship 
between audit meetings and firm reporting fraud. 
Different results found by [31], show that 
frequency of audit meetings is positively related to 
intellectual capital.  For Saudi non-financial firms 
have found that there is no influence of audit 
committee on firm performance [2]. For Italian 
non-financial listed firms [32], have proved that 
number of audit meetings is associated with 
information disclosure. In [33] opine that frequency 
of audit committee meetings contributes in 
reducing earning management. In the same line, the 
frequency of audit meeting might improve and 
enhance the effectiveness of audit committee, this 
argument have been discussed and supported by 
[34]. In [35] provides evidence from Middle East, 
shows that frequency of meeting has significant 
negative relationship with financial distress. In 
order to provide effective oversight and control on 
financial decisions, the corporate audit committee 
needs to have more frequency of meetings. 
Therefore, hypothesis can be drafted:  
Hypothesis 6:  The audit committee frequent 
meetings of publicly listed firms of Malaysia have 
an impact on capital structure. 
3.1 Sample Selection and Data Collection 
Procedures 
To achieve research goals the appropriate research 
methodology and data collection techniques shall 
be carefully selected. This section provides a 
detailed description of the stages taken to prepare 
for the chosen sample and analysis tool of this 
study. 
3.2 Sample and Data Sources 
This study believes that sampling is a statistical 
tool used to choose proper size of samples from the 
population. Thus, the samples will be selected from 
Malaysia market for two years and all sectors based 
on availability of data in Bloomberg Database from 
Malaysia community population. The study sample 
is not randomly selected; the sample of study was 
selected based on predetermined criteria using 
Bloomberg Data. Which means the data availability 
can be recognized since the company submits its 
data to Bloomberg. 
3.3 Variables 
This section provides information about variables 
used in this study. For discovering the relationship 
of conducted study, all variables should be clearly 
explained. This study uses dependent and 
independent variables to test the relationship 
between internal corporate governance attributes 
and capital structure for Malaysian market. These 
variables are explained as followings: 
3.4 Dependent Variable 
In the line with this study uses debt to equity ratio 
as dependent variable. This study calculates debt to 
equity ratio as the total debt divided by total equity.  
3.5 Independent Variables 
The explanatory variables in this study include: (i) 
board composition, (ii) board size, (iii) board 
meeting, (iv) audit committee composition, (v) 
audit committee size, and (vi) audit committee 
meeting. The detailed operational definitions, 
metrics and symbol of variables used in this study 
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Table 1. Variables Definitions 
Variables Operational Definition Metrics Symbol Scale 
Corporate Governance     
Board Composition The board which has 
a majority of outside 
directors who do not 
have engagement to 
firm business to avoid 
conflict of interest. 
The percentage of 
independent directors 
on the board 
BComp Ratio 
 
Board Size The number of 
directors on the board 
including CEO and 
Chairman of firm. 
The number of 





The number of 
meetings that should 
be hold for each 
accounting year to 
discuss policy issues 
related to firm 
activity. 
Frequency of 





Audit committee is in 




members should be 
made up of outside 
directors who are 
independents. 
The percentage of 
independent directors 
on the committee. 
ACComp Ratio 
Audit Committee Size The number of 
members who 
overseeing the quality 
of financial report and 
accounting 
information for each 
accounting year. 
The number of 
members on audit 
committee. 
ACsize Nominal 
Audit Committee Activity 
 
The members meet at 
least once a year to 
discuss and review 
the financial report 




meetings of audit 
committee 
ACmeet Nominal 
Corporate Finance     
Debt to equity Ratio The ration that refers 
to mix of equity and 
debt to finance the 
assets of firm. 




For hypothesis testing, regression analysis will be 
used in this study, and also to discover the 
relationship between corporate governance factors 
and debt to equity ratio based on new theoretical 
framework. More specifically, the regression will 
identify the relationship among dependent and 
independent variables. The following equation 
represents the general model in this study: 
 Y = a+β1 X1+β2 X2+β3 X3+β4 X4+β5 X5+β6 
X6+E                      (1) 
 
Where:  
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β = slope of the independent variables. 
X = independent variables. 
E = error term. 
4.1 Descriptive Statistic and Empirical 
Results and Discussion  
This section provides interpretations to the results 
of study and discusses the statistical methods that 
have been used to test the data in Malaysian 
market. Besides, this section is important to 
provide support for the argument that capital 
structure can be explained by the main internal 
corporate governance. Also, the nexus between 
corporate governance and capital structure is 
explained and elaborated in detail. Then, the 
complementarities tests of governance factors and 
corporate capital structure are presented. Finally, 
some additional important tests are carried out, for 
example, Heteroscedacity, Autocorrelation, 
Multicollinearity, and normality or error test. 
4.2 Descriptive Statistic 
Tables 2 and 3 show the descriptive statistics of the 
main independent and dependent variables used in 
this study based on the selected samples in 
developing markets. The descriptive statistics are 
provided for Malaysian market as below: 
Table 2. Descriptive Statistic for Malaysian Listed Firms 
Variables N Minimum Maximum Mean Std. 
Deviation 
LNDer 92 -2.18 6.39 3.8236 1.51463 
LNBsize 92 1.61 2.71 2.1801 .23311 
LNBcomp 92 3.43 4.49 3.8903 .25867 
LNBmeet 92 1.10 3.04 1.9687 .43605 
LNACsize 92 1.10 1.79 1.2697 .19567 
LNAComp 92 4.09 4.61 4.4380 .18274 
LNACmeet 92 .69 2.89 1.7708 .40578 
Source: SPSS 22 output, 2018. 
 
The table above shows the minimum value of debt 
to equity ratio of firms in Malaysian market is -2.18 
and the maximum value is 6.39. The mean for debt 
to equity ratio is 3.8236. The mean for debt to 
equity ratio is 3.4755.  Based on that, the 
descriptive statistic shows that firms of Malaysian 
market issue more debt. 
As it is shown in table above, the minimum value 
of board size of Malaysian firms is 1.61, and 
maximum value is 2.61. And the mean of board 
size is 2.1801. The mean value of board size 
appends credence to the results by [36], they 
suggest that the smaller board members are more 
effective and productive at monitoring of firm. This 
also consists with findings of [37]. This also can be 
explained by [38], has found that large firms with 
large board size tend to have negative relationship 
to firm performance of UK firms. 
The minimum value of board composition in 
Malaysian market is 3.43 and the maximum value 
is 4.49. And the mean of board composition is 
3.8903. In [39], find that board with independent 
members is more monitoring and more closely to 
shareholders objectives. 
The minimum value of board meeting of Malaysian 
firms is 1.10 and maximum value is 3.04. The 
mean of board meeting is 1.9687. Based on the 
literature, more number of meetings of the board of 
director the more productive output.  
The minimum value of audit committee size for 
Malaysian firms is 1.10, and the maximum value is 
1.79. And the mean value of audit committee size 
for Malaysian firms is 1.2697. The analysis results 
to adds credence to the output by Aldamen et al., 
[27]. 
The minimum value of audit committee 
composition of Malaysian firms is 4.09, and 
maximum value is 4.61. The mean value is 4.4380.  
The minimum value for audit committee meeting 
of Malaysian firms is .069, and maximum value is 
2.89, while the mean value is 1.7708.  
 
Table 3. Correlations Coefficients Results for Sample of Study 
 Variables  LNACmeet LNAComp LNBcomp LNBsize LNACsize LNBmeet 
Model 1 LNACmeet       
 LNAComp -.062      
 LNBcomp -.141 -.302     
 LNBsize -.289 -.034 .401    
 LNACsize .182 .353 -.285 -.295   
 LNBmeet -.704 .085 -.039 .106 -.382  
 
Table 3 above shows some variables have a 
moderate correlation and some do not. For 
example, audit committee meeting has the highest 
negative value of correlation in model with value of 
70.4% which means this correlation is moderate 
linear relationship. Audit committee meeting is also 
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negatively and significantly correlated with board 
size which was valued at 29%. In addition, audit 
committee composition is negatively correlated 
with board composition at value of 30%, and 
positively correlated to audit committee size with 
value of 35%. Board composition is positively 
correlated to board size at value of 40% and 
negatively correlated to audit committee size at 
value of 29%. Board size is negatively correlated to 
audit committee size with value of 30% but is not 
correlated to board meeting. Finally, audit 
committee size is negatively correlated to board 
meeting at value of 39% which indicates to 
moderate level of coefficient correlation. 
Complementarities of Corporate Governance 
Attributes Tests 
The tables 4, 5, 6, and 7 show the results of 
complementary test of internal corporate 
governance factors and their influence on capital 
structure. This test is performed to gauge the value 
of internal corporate governance in both countries. 
The first removed variable is board size to test 
whether board size is the Edgeworth complement 
of audit committee size in the model. The results 
(See table 4) provides changing in significance 
level of audit committee size in model.  
 
Table 4. Effect on Audit Committee Size after Removal of Board Size 
Variables Before Remove After Remove 
Constant .909 .258 
LNBcomp .939 .366 
LNBmeet .021 .041 
LNACsize .048 .180 
LNACComp .959 .980 
LNACmeet .479 .968 
R-squared .149 .094 
Adjusted R-squared .088 .040 
Durbin-Waston 2.176 2.181 
F-statistic 2.429 1.746 
 
Based on the above information in table 4, the test 
has proved changing in significance level of audit 
committee size in the model. The P value in 
original model is statistically significant at 0.048 
but after remove the board size, the audit 
committee size becomes insignificant at P value of 
0.180. This means (hypothesis 2a) is accepted in 
the model. Therefore, the removal of board size has 
influenced the relationship between audit 
committee size and financial decision. This 
indicates that these attributes are Edgeworth 
complements.  
 
Table 5. Effect on Board Size after Removal of Audit Committee Size 
Variables Before Remove After Remove 
Constant .909 .691 
LNBcomp .939 .613 
LNBmeet .021 .094 
LNBsize .023 .079 
LNACComp .959 .493 
LNACmeet .479 .730 
R-squared .149 .108 
Adjusted R-squared .088 .055 
Durbin-Waston 2.176 2.220 
F-statistic 2.429 2.034 
 
In the table above is shown the result in the model 
after removal of audit committee size.  In addition, 
this removal creates changing in coefficient of 
board size. The p-value in original model is 
statistically significant at 0.023 but this value 
turned into insignificant of 0.079 after removal. 
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Table 6. Effect on Audit Committee Size after Removal of Board Meeting 
Variables Before Remove After Remove 
Constant .909 .786 
LNBcomp .939 .870 
LNBsize .023 .046 
LNACSize .048 .247 
LNACComp .959 .805 
LNACmeet .479 .195 
R-squared .149 .092 
Adjusted R-squared .088 .038 
Durbin-Waston 2.176 2.205 
F-statistic 2.429 1.707 
 
Table 6 shows that audit committee size in the 
model is affected by removal of corporate board 
meeting from the original model. The p-value in 
original model is statistically significant at the 0.05 
level. This p-value becomes .247 in new model; 
this means removal the board meeting effects the 
relationship between audit committee size and debt 
to equity ratio. Therefore, the audit committee size 
is Edgeworth complement with board meeting in 
the model.  
 
Table 7. Effect on Board Meeting after Removal of Audit Committee Size 
Variables Before Remove After Remove 
Constant .909 .691 
LNBcomp .939 .613 
LNBsize .023 .079 
LNBmeet .021 .094 
LNACComp .959 .493 
LNACmeet .479 .730 
R-squared .149 .108 
Adjusted R-squared .088 .055 
Durbin-Waston 2.176 2.220 
F-statistic 2.429 2.034 
 
The table above introduces whether corporate 
governance bundle works together as substitutes or 
complements. The analysis in the model proves that 
board meeting is affected after removing audit 
committee size from the original model. The p-
value of board meeting in the original model is 
0.021, after removal audit committee size, the p-
value becomes 0.094. It can be concluded that audit 
committee size and board meeting affect the capital 
structure when they work together.  
5. Empirical Results and Discussion   
The first hypothesis is consistent with the 
expectation of study where the result shows that 
there is a significant relationship with contrary sign 
between board size and financial decision of 
Malaysian firms. This result is in the line with the 
prior results of [40], In [41], that board size is 
correlated significantly with financial performance. 
Another results from comparative analysis between 
Singapore and Malaysia by [42] that boar size is 
related to lower abnormal working capital accruals 
(accounting quality). Nevertheless, the finding also 
is different from that of study by [43] that board 
composition is not related to financial performance 
of a firm. These different findings may be due to 
different samples and corporate governance code in 
which these investigations were based. This result 
is supported by agency theory which suggests that 
the conflict of interest leads to bad governance, 
thus and logically, large board size leads to 
miscommunication and understanding among 
board’s members, and this decreases the quality of 
control and decision-making due to ineffective 
board “free-riders”.  
This study finds that board independent is 
positively and not significantly associated with 
financial decision. The results of this study show 
that the high proportion of board members is not 
effective in monitoring the financial decision for 
Malaysian listed firms. This supports the results by 
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Şener, Varoğlu, and Aren [23], Rashid, Afzalur, 
Anura De Zoysa, Sudhir Lodh, that there is no 
significant influence between outside directors and 
firm performance. In addition, there is no optimal 
board independent for all firms, since each member 
of the board has different education and skills [23]. 
This result does not support agency theory 
perspective where agency theory assumes that 
conflict of interest can be mitigated when the 
outside directors are independent. This finding is 
supported by the argument that smaller board is 
likely to have less independent members. This 
result may be because board size in this research 
sample is negligible.  Descriptive statistic shows a 
board size mean of only 2 members. Small board 
gives low level of independence. Thus, it is 
unlikely that less independence can mitigate the 
possible conflict of interests between management 
and investors. Another reason may support this 
result is most of Malaysian firms are oriented and 
controlled by family business.  
This study states that board meeting is negatively 
and significantly associated with debt-to-equity 
ratio. A plausible explanation of this finding is that 
number of meetings of the board of directors is a 
sign to regular monitoring of financial decisions 
quality of a firm rather than an indication of the 
board’s urgent meeting request for special cases. 
This research provides evidence that number of 
meetings may affect firm financial decision. This 
evidence is supported by prior results by Ntim and 
Osei [26] that board meeting is significantly and 
positively correlated with firm performance.  
Another study by Aldamen et al [27], provides 
evidence that the smaller size of audit committee 
with more financial expertise is more likely to have 
a positive influence on firm performance of 
Australian listed firms. This result is consistent 
with perspective of Jensen [13], where this study 
assumes that smaller size of audit members is more 
beneficial than lager size, because large number of 
members gives room for much discussion and 
different opinions, and then the free riders problem 
arises. As conclusion, this study recommends that 
the size of members should not be too small and 
not too large. The small size suffers from lack of 
advice based on experience, while too large size 
increases the free-riders. Finally, the size of 
members should be somehow that the value of firm 
increase. 
Audit committee composition hypothesis shows a 
negative influence and insignificant relationship 
with financial decision. This result can be 
explained that independent members have no role 
to play in data sample of Malaysia.  
Inconsistent with this study’s hypothesis of audit 
committee activity, the audit committee meeting is 
negatively and insignificant associated with debt-
to-equity ratio. A plausible explanation of this 
result is that the number of meetings during the 
year is not enough for Malaysian company to 
enhance corporate governance effectiveness where 
the mean of meetings is only 1.78; this number is 
small to provide a high quality of accounting 
information and best decision for finance choice. 
This study suggests that members of audit 
committee should meet frequently to help board of 
directors to reduce and meet best mix of finance 
resource. Another suggested reason which may 
preclude the audit committee to work efficiently is 
that the lack of chance to assess the independence 
and suitability of external auditors where the 
Malaysian code of governance 2012 recommends 
that audit committee should have procedures and 
policies to appraise the independence of external 
auditors. 
6. Conclusion 
 (i) There is a positively and significantly 
relationship between board size and debt to equity 
ratio. 
(ii) There is a positive and insignificant relationship 
between board composition and debt to equity 
ratio. 
(iii) There is a positively and significantly 
relationship between board meeting and debt to 
equity ratio. 
(iv) There is a negatively and significantly 
relationship between audit committee size and debt 
to equity ratio. 
(v) There is a negative effect and insignificant 
relationship between audit committee composition 
and debt to equity ratio. 
(vi) There is a negative effect and insignificant 
relationship between audit committee meeting and 
debt to equity ratio. 
(vii) Audit committee size has complementary 
effect when it works with board size. 
(viii) Board size has complementary effect when it 
works with audit committee size. 
(ix) Audit committee size has complementary 
effect when it works with board meeting. 
(x) Board meeting has complementary effect when 
it works with Audit committee size. 
Based on above results, it can be concluded that 
corporate governance attributes are important tools 
to enhance the best choice of finance in developing 
countries by supply chain strategy. Despite possible 
limitations of this study, this study contributes to 
the existing literature, the influence of corporate 
governance attributes on capital structure in 
Malaysian market. This study also provides 
evidence that good practice of corporate 
governance helps board of director to make 
efficient financial decision in presence of corporate 
audit committee. In practice, this study has 
implications for firms’ needs to satisfy creditors, 
shareholders and of course to attract potential 
investors. Study the influence of monitoring tools 
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such as main attributes of corporate governance 
allows the decision makers to estimate the role of 
these tools in enhancing the perception of 
interested parties toward the firm. If mentioned 
parties are able to have accessibility to accounting 
information, their financial decision can be more 
effective and accurate. This study reveals results 
that will enable shareholders, investors, creditors, 
and other interested parties to ameliorate their 
decision-making. It is useful to measure the 
different mechanisms of corporate governance to 
allow beneficiary parties to be careful of managers’ 
manipulation and policy. The relevant authorities 
of corporate governance, especially in Malaysia, 
can use this research as empirical support to 
develop their guidance and recommendations on 
code of corporate governance. The results of this 
study can be also employed by stock exchange 
bodies in improving the quality of accounting 
information. To improve and amend the code of 
corporate governance in particular country, the 
empirical results should be taken into 
consideration. This study offers evidence for 
improving the code of corporate governance in 
Malaysia. The results of this research also help to 
identify which corporate governance factors are 
likely to influence on capital structure in Malaysia 
market. The results show that board size, board 
meeting, and audit committee size are important 
factors, and that small boards and frequency of 
meeting sitting on the board are effective in 
choosing of best mix of finance for Malaysian 
market.  
These study limitations are namely, sample, data, 
and variables limitations. Nonetheless, a great 
effort and focused were made to accomplish and 
achieve the research objectives. And this effort 
helped to answer research questions of this study. 
The study sample is not randomly selected; the 
sample of study was selected based on 
predetermined criteria using Bloomberg Data. 
Because there are a limited number of firms that 
submitted their data to Bloomberg system, it is very 
difficult to select firms randomly. And this led to 
smaller size of sample. Finally, this research uses 
only Malaysian data, care should be considered for 
more than one country where large area of study 
contributes and   nourishes the existing literature 
and the results can be more generalized. Another 
limitation in this study is number of variables; the 
selection of a certain set of corporate governance 
measurements and capital structure proxies is a 
limitation that needs to be taken into consideration 
to study more and mix proxies for independent and 
dependent variables.     
With respect to future line of the research, care 
should be taken to increase the sample size and 
corporate governance attributes, particularly the 
inclusion of external mechanisms of governance 
that may have an effect when they are mixed with 
internal characteristics of governance. In addition, 
the need to investigate the effect of corporate 
governance measurements when external factors of 
governance are introduced will make the results of 
the study more robust. More importantly, the 
previous literature provides a sample selection bias 
to developed and developing markets. A possible 
second avenue for study, this study suggests the 
effort should be devoted to examine bigger size of 
sample for more than one market and to take the 
economics and political aspects into consideration, 
this is can be a great interest for future study. 
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